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Introduction 
Incentives for Innovation 
Since the end of the 1970s much discontent has been expressed about a decrease in capital 
expenditures by Western companies.1 This investment gap - measured by corporate investment 
as a declining percentage of GNP- is cause for concern,2 and reflects a low level of innovation. 
Clearly, during the period under consideration, Western companies did not find enough 
opportunities for capital expenditures that would have yielded higher returns than they 
anticipated from investing the money in the financial markets. The low level of innovation and 
the resulting investment gap led not only to lower economic growth rates but also hindered 
structural change.3 
    One possible reason for this development is related to the conditions under which managers 
are willing to take risks. Investments and innovations are generally accompanied by high risks 
and uncertain returns. The relationship between investment and innovation gaps, on the one 
hand, and expected profits and equity capital, on the othet, is extensively covered in the 
literature,4 which presumes a positive correlation between the willingness to take risks and 
profit expectations.5 This assumption is also postulated in the Portfolio-Selection-Theory.6 
Similarly, in the Risk-Analysis-Model of D.B. Hertz a positive correlation between profit 
expectation and a risktaking attitude is assumed.7 
    However, the hypothesis of a positive correlation between profit expectation and risk-taking 
behavior in investment or innovation decisions is not undisputed. Bowman for example, found 
that highly profitable American companies showed a lower willingness to take risks than less-
profitable ones. He described this phenomenon as a "Risk/Return-Paradox."8 This raised the 
question as to whether the profit expectations are the only determinant for the risk-taking 
attitude of companies. Many empirical studies have analyzed the relationship between profit 
expectations and risk-taking attitudes.9 Figure 1 distinguishes those studies which focus an 
analyzing the effect of risk/return patterns an innovation decisions from those which focus 
mainly on the effect of risk/return patterns at the individual or firm level. All of these studies 
lead to a fundamental question: Are innovations initiated by chances for profit, or does 
Schumpeter's hypothesis hold, i.e., that crises serve as motivators of innovation?10 If the latter 
is true, different risk/return patterns have to be seen as the decisive determinants of innovation. 
The following analysis of this issue is based an an empirical study in which 230 executives 
from twenty large German corporations were confronted with different simulated situations. 
Tables 4 and 5 show the age structure and educational backgrounds of the respondents, and 
Tables 6 and 7 summarize the results of the survey. 
 
 
Definitions 
Innovation. "Innovation" sterns from Latin (innovatio). Its semantic meaning is "renewal" or 
"creating something new." In the last decade innovation management has become a key issue 
for companies. A frequently cited definition of Innovation by Knight reads: "Innovation is 
adoption of a chance which is new to an organization and to its relevant environment."11 Geiger 
and Heyn more precisely define innovation as an approach to a solution having advantages 
compared to previous solutions.12 While an invention represents the creation of new knowledge 
(discovery), innovation refers to the commitment to develop, on the basis of that invention, a 
new product or process, and to market the result(s). 
    Innovations can be classified according to many criteria. Common classifications are 
product, process and social innovations.13 Product innovation refers to either a new product or 
the improvement of an existing one.14 Often companies consider as an innovation a product they  
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bring to market which they had not previously produced, even if this product had already been 
marketed by other companies. In the following, however, we define product innovation as a 
product, or service, which has not previously been on the market. Variations on existing 
products we define as product improvements. By the term process innovation we mean either a 
new or an improved manufacturing process15 in which the application of new knowledge results 
in increased productivity or quality in the production process. 
    Social innovations involve either changes in standards and/or changes in the forms of 
interaction between individuals or groups of individuals.16  
    Risk. The concept of risk, defined in different ways in the literature, can be divided into three 
main categories.17 Those in the first category, based on Knight's definition, make a distinction 
between risk and uncertainty.18 Risk is defined by a decision Situation where an a priori 
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probability or where a posteriori statistical probabilities exist. The second category defines risk 
or venture by the possibility that the objectives might not be reached or be only partly 
achieved.19 The third category makes no distinction between risk and uncertainty; both concepts 
are used synonymously.20 In this last case, insufficient information is entered under 
uncertainty.21 
    In order not to restrict our study, we use both the definition of risk by Knight as well as the 
definition of risk based an the difference between an established target and the actual 
achievement of the target. 
    Risk Aversion and Risk Taking. Since decisions to innovate involve great uncertainty, the 
decision maker will try, by using additional sources of information, to reduce the uncertainty to 
an acceptable level, or he will not take that risk at all. If he decides to keep the current Situation 
unchanged in the interests of remaining at a security level that appears easier to manage, he will 
reject the risk. On the other hand, there are risk takers who see mainly opportunity in every 
risky decision. Thus one can distinguish risk-avoiding and risk-taking behavior.22 
 
 
Decisions to Innovate 
Opportunities and Risks of Product Innovations 
Empirical research shows that new product ideas are characterized by a very low probability of 
success. Buggy found that out of 600 product ideas only thirty turned into successful market 
entries.23 Experience has demonstrated that only 3 percent to 5 percent of all product ideas result 
in market success. If, however, new product ideas are properly evaluated, screened and 
analyzed, the rate of success increases 20 percent and 25 percent.24 Even considering this higher 
success rate, the chances of returns an innovative product ideas are highly uncertain. When a 
company has to make an innovation decision, there are those in the company who see mainly 
the 75 percent to 80 percent likelihood of failure, white others only see the 20 percent to 25 
percent probability of success. In this respect Witte25 distinguishes between a "Power-promoter" 
and an "Idea-promoter." The Power-promoter is the person in the company who has the power 
to convince the risk averters that it may be worthwhile to undertake the risk. The Idea-promoter 
provides the support to overcome the competency barriers. In practice, the Power-promoter 
offen has a tendency to Orient himself toward the 70 percent to 75 percent probability of failure, 
while the Idea-promoter, who is mostly fascinated by his own ideas sees mainly the 20 percent 
to 25 percent likelihood of success. The chances that a product innovation will be initiated 
depend, therefore, on the interaction between Power-promoters and Idea-promoters and their 
readiness to take risks. In innovation management the role of the Power-promoter is the crucial 
one, because he is the only person able to transform an invention into an innovation. Hence, in 
our empirical study, we concentrated our analysis on the risk-taking behavior of the Power-
promotor. 
 
 
Opportunities and Risks of Process Innovations 
While the chances of success for innovative product ideas are relatively low, empirical research 
shows that process innovations have a considerably higher probability of success.26 A survey 
by Biehl shows that the higher the degree of novelty, the higher are the chances of success for 
process innovations.27 Consequently, the initiation of a process innovation requires a lower risk-
taking attitude on the part of the decision maker than is the case with product ideas. 
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Innovations and Decision Making 
Our earlier discussion of the Risk/Return-Paradox suggested that the willingness to undertake 
risk depends on the specific situation of an individual (for example, the Power-promotor) or a 
company. Therefore in our study we distinguish two fundamentally different situations . In the 
first Situation - what we have termed an "opportunity case" – the company is already in a 
profitable position. In this situation, if an individual or a company can, without innovating, 
expect even higher positive returns, will this increase the willingness of a Power-promotor or a 
company to take the higher risk of innovation? The second situation assumes that the company 
is in a crisis - what we have termed a "crisis case." The question is whether the Power-promotor 
or the company would behave differently, depending upon which of the two situations each is 
in. 
    To address this question we simulated both an opportunity and a crisis case for our survey. 
For each of these cases, we assumed "certain" and "uncertain" alternatives. For the opportunity 
case, characterized by a company in an overall profitable Situation, we assumed an investment 
with a certain (i.e., an assured) return an investment (ROI) of 10 percent (see Table 1). In real 
life such a certain return would take the form of a secure investment (e.g., a bank deposit) or a 
"continue-as-now" decision within the company. Two uncertain alternatives differing in their 
probability distribution on profitability were set against the certain-alternative Situation. In the 
first uncertain alternative, we assumed a 75 percent probability of a 15 percent ROI, with a 
remaining 25 percent probability of a 0 percent ROI (Decision 1). In the second uncertain 
alternative, we assumed a 75 percent probability of a 0 percent ROI, with a remaining 25 percent 
probability of a 45 percent ROI (Decision II). Table 1 summarizes the alternatives in our 
opportunity case. 
    The difference between the uncertain alternatives is that in Decision 1, Table 1 the likelihood 
of failure (represented by a 0 percent return) is only 25 percent, whereas in Decision II it is 75 
percent (see Table 1). Furthermore, the increase in returns from 10 percent (the certain 
alternative) to 15 percent (the first uncertain alternative) is a high probability (75 percent), while 
the very considerable improvement in returns from 10 percent (the certain alternative) to 45 
percent (the second uncertain alternative) has a relatively low probability (25 percent). 
    As noted earlier, process innovations are typically characterized by the potential for 
improved returns and limited risk. Therefore, the uncertain alternative in Decision 1, Table 1 
broadly corresponds with a process innovation.  
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Although the chances of success for product innovations are relatively low, if new product ideas 
do lead to successful innovations, greater returns can often be expected. We have tried to 
simulate this situation with the uncertain alternative in Decision II, through which a 
considerable improvement in the expected returns can be assumed (from the 10 percent ROI 
(the certain alternative) to the 45 percent ROI through the uncertain alternative in Decision II). 
On the other hand, the likelihood of a drop in returns to 0 percent is very high (75 percent). 
Therefore we can broadly identify the uncertain alternative in Decision II with a product 
innovation. 
    We also studied crisis situations wherein the Power-promotor and the company had to expect 
losses. We defined as the certain alternative a loss of 10 percent an investment (see Table 2). 
In real life, this alternative could result from a continue-as-now decision. We set two uncertain 
alternatives against the certain loss of 10 percent. 
    The first uncertain alternative is characterized 
by a high probability (75 percent) that the company can achieve break-even (ROI of 0 percent) 
which will lead out of the loss situation. In this alternative, however, there is also a 25 percent 
probability that the company will suffer a negative ROI of 45 percent (see Decision III in Table 
2). We used Decision III to stimulate process innovation, which can lead to rationalization 
within the company. If rationalization is unsuccessful, however, the company will lose its 
competitiveness, and this will lead to the high losses assumed here. 
Our second uncertain alternative in Decision IV, Table 2 reflects a situation in which a company 
has a 75 percent probability of suffering a negative ROI of 15 percent, with a remaining 
probability of 25 percent that it will reach the break-evenpoint (ROI of 0 percent; Decision IV). 
Given the 75 percent probability of failure and only a 25 percent probability that the company 
will come out of the crisis, this uncertain alternative reflects a product-innovation decision (see 
Tables 2 and 3). 
    Table 3 describes the situations simulated through the different alternatives. 
 
 
Results 
Table 6 shows the results for the process innovations. It compares the certain alternatives 
(continue-as-now or certain investment) with the uncertain alternative of a process Innovation. 
If we assume that a manager is risk neutral, he should choose the alternative of process 
innovation in order to maximize the expected value of his returns. However, 61 percent of the 
managers in the opportunity case (Decision 1, Table 1) preferred the certain alternative to the 
insecure process innovation. Here, risk aversion at a significance level of 0.05 was observed. 
    This is a very interesting result: In a situation where managers could afford to take risks 
(opportunity case) they behaved like risk averters and preferred a certain investment or a 
continue-as-now decision in comparison to an uncertain process innovation, even though the 
latter alternative had a high chance (75 percent) of success. This behavior is not too difficult to 
explain. In such a decision situation, a risk-taking attitude of a manager could endanger his 
career. This has to do with information. If one measures information content (ᐃI) as the 
difference between what one expects and the actual outcome, then the general expectation in 
an opportunity Situation is that the company will generate a profit. Under these circumstances, 
the manager generates a profit, but the ᐃI for his superiors is close to zero, because everybody 
expected a profit. If, however, he generates a loss in this situation, everybody will ask why he 
is producing a loss when everybody else is producing a profit. Thus, "bad information" about 
this manager is generated, thereby endangering his future career. Why should he take that risk 
if he has the secure alternative through which he will lose nothing. Risk aversion from his point 
of view may be a better strategy than taking the risk of creating "bad information" about his 
performance. 
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In the crisis case (Decision III, Tables 2 and 6), the homo economicus, to avoid the 25 percent 
probability of a negative 45 percent ROI, should choose the continue-as-now alternative. In our 
study, however, 85 percent of the managers opted for the process innovation against the 
continue-as-now alternative (see Table 6), even though the expected value of the return of a 
process innovation could be lower (-15 percent) than the -10 percent of the continueas-now 
alternative (see Table 2, Decision III). Here, the significance level is 0.001. Table 6 clearly 
shows that in a crisis case, a process innovation is considerably more often initiated than in an 
opportunity case. So the same manager who, in an opportunity Situation, was a risk averter 
becomes, in a crisis situation, a risk taker. This behavior is again easy to explain. In a crisis case 
the general expectation is that the company will produce a loss. Even if the manager produces 
an even higher loss than anticipated, the ᐃI, taking the increased risk of failure into account, 
remains relatively low. The negative Impact on his career may even be marginal, because 
everybody generates losses. If, however, he brings the company to the break-even point, he will 
become the turnaround manager and generate positive ᐃI for his career. Risk taking for the 
manager now pays off. Thus, our research has shown that the risktaking attitude of managers 
depends on the situation of the company: A crisis situation leads to higher risk taking and 
therefore innovations can be easier achieved. An opportunity Situation seems to be an obstacle 
to innovations. Perhaps only few things can constitute a higher obstacle for innovations than 
the present success of a company. Thus, if one joins a profitable company and suggests 
innovations, the likelihood of change is relatively small. 
    Table 7 compares the certain alternative of an investment or the continue-as-now scenario 
with a product innovation (Decision II, Tables 1 and 7, Decision IV, Tables 2 and 7). Table 7 
shows that in an opportunity Situation the certain investment or continue-as-now scenario is by 
far preferred to the uncertain product innovation (Decision II, Tables 1 and 7). The managers 
had a high-risk aversion in the opportunity case even if the expected value of return of the 
certain alternative is lower than that of the uncertain alternative. This risk-taking attitude of 
managers is easily understood. Why should a manager, taking the above mentioned ᐃI into 
account, opt for a 75 percent likelihood of failure if he can choose the certain alternative which 
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will yield an ROI of 10 percent? It would be a great achievement if he could, with a 25 percent 
probability, reach an ROI of 45 percent. In this case, however, the German saying, "Victory has 
many fathers, defeat none," might appropriately be applied. Even if successful, the manager 
will not get all of the credit - others, however inappropriately, will claim their share. So the 
positive impact of a higher risk-taking attitude an his future career might become marginal. 
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    In a crisis situation, however, the continueas-now scenario is hardly opted for (29 percent), 
whereas the alternative of product innovation is selected by 71 percent of the managers 
(Decision IV, Tables 2 and 7). Both decisions (II and IV, Tables 2 and 7) have a significance 
level of 0.001. If managers wanted to maximize the expected value of returns and be risk 
neutral, they had to choose, in the crisis case the continue-as-now alternative. Again, the 
decision is obvious if one considers the managers' situation. Managers will see the possibility 
of generating a positive ᐃI for their career by taking the higher risk even if this alternative has 
only a 25 percent probability of occurring. If disaster strikes, they can point to the fact that the 
certain alternative would also have produced a negative 10 percent ROI. Again the results 
demonstrate that the firm's situation at the moment of decision shapes the risk-taking or 
riskavoiding attitudes of managers, and risk neutrality cannot be assumed in the described 
decision alternatives. Table 7 demonstrates that product innovations are more likely to occur in 
crisis cases than in opportunity cases. 
    Tables 6 and 7 also show that in an opportunity case, process innovations are preferred to 
product innovations. In both decisions (Decision 1, Tables 1 and 6, and Decision III, Tables 2 
and 7) the certain investment or the continue-as-now alternative is preferred: 
 
Where ">" means "is preferred to," we find: 
Investment or Continue-as-Now > Process Innovation > Product Innovation. 
 
Also in a crisis case, process innovation is preferred to product innovation. But it is clear that a 
crisis case generates considerable initial forces favoring both process and product innovation. 
In crisis cases, managers behave as follows: 
 
Process Innovation > Product Innovation > Continue-as-Now. 
 
These results indicate, furthermore, that in an opportunity case it is considerably more difficult 
for an Idea-promoter to find a Power-promoter willing to take risks. 
    In a crisis situation, however, the Ideapromoter will find greater receptivity for his innovative 
ideas with a Power-promoter, since the latter will want to clutch at that straw which could help 
him out of the crisis. These results match those of the Schumpeter thesis (a crisis situation as a 
promotor for innovations) and modifies the classical thesis of the risk/return approach (positive 
correlation between risk taking and the expectation of a positive return). Empirical surveys on 
the Allais' paradox show a similar aversion to risk in favorable situations. Respondents were 
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asked whether they would prefer a certain alternative (with a secure return of $100) to an 
uncertain one with a 10 percent probability of a $500 return, an 89 percent probability of a 
$1,000 return, and a 1 percent probability of a $0 return).28 Although the expected value of the 
uncertain alternative was $940 ($500 x 10 percent [$50] + $1,000 x 89 percent [$890] = $940), 
the majority of respondents chose the certain alternative.29 These results showed that 
management theory should view the company's situation as having a major impact on the 
willingness to innovate.30 
 
 
Crisis and Innovations 
The results of this study, although seemingly obvious, raise a crucial question: Do companies 
need a crisis to become innovative? Maybe "need" is too strong a term, but clearly a crisis 
situation is highly conducive to innovation in a company. This fact suggests a very interesting 
model for the innovation process at the company level, with many implications for innovation 
management. Figure 2 summarizes the model. Assume a new company. From experience we 
know that many newly founded companies fall. If on the other hand, the company succeeds, it 
nonetheless evolves into an opportunity situation, in which it develops an attitude of risk 
aversion. As it behaves like risk averters it does not innovate; it especially avoids product 
innovations. Because it neglects product innovation it is sooner or later faced with structural 
problems in its productportfolio.31 The result - crisis. As we have seen, managers develop a 
higher willingness to take risks in a crisis situation. They want to restructure the company. As 
Figure 2 shows, the first activity they prefer is process innovation; e.g., measures to rationalize 
the company's activities. They even opt for product innovations to get out of the crisis. If they 
do not succeed, the company drops out; if they are able to restructure the company, it overcomes 
the crisis and moves to the next opportunity situation. And the whole process begins again. 
    Our research at the company level supports the empirically founded Kondratieff32 cycles and 
the Batra33 cycles of development. Also, the interrelations between the various factors shown 
in Figure 2 indicate that companies may need a crisis to innovate, or at least that a crisis is very 
helpful in eliciting innovation. This theory of structural change stemming from crises also 
explains phenomena of the last four decades. This is especially true for the losers of World War 
II: Germany and Japan. The development of the overall economy and the development of 
companies are closely knit. The crisis years from 1945 to 1955 promoted a risk-taking attitude 
in both the German and Japanese economies. Since the two countries had nothing to lose, 
choosing between the uncertain alternatives was the only alternative, since the continue-as-now 
approach was impossible. This risk-taking attitude led, until the midfifties and the beginning of 
the sixties, to a structural change through process and, later, product innovations. West 
Germany, overcoming its crisis in the mid-sixties, evolved in the late sixties and early seventies 
into an opportunity situation. During the latter period, German companies had enough certain 
alternatives to remain profitable, hence innovation was not seen as especially necessary. This 
attitude, however, led the Germans, in the mid-seventies and early eighties, into a new crisis 
situation. Since then the German companies have been keenly aware of the need to innovate. 
Currently, Germany is striving to regain its competitive strength through structural change 
based an innovation.  
    Germany's experience demonstrates how questionable it is to regard profit opportunities as 
conducive to innovation. During the sixties, German companies enjoyed high equity and 
profitability levels, growing markets and economic and political stability. Despite all of these 
positive ingredients, the innovation gap we are deploring today emerged during that period.  
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    Willingness to innovate presupposes crisis. There is a high likelihood that the current crisis 
in Japan has developed in the same way that its counterpart did in Germany. The feeling of 
having a superior economy and Japanese success in the world markets have led Japan into the 
same Position that Germany was in ten to fifteen years ago. Then the Germans joked about the 
British disease, meaning that the decline of the United Kingdom's economy was due to British 
complacency. Nowadays the Koreans joke about the Japanese disease which refers to the 
complacency in Japan. 
    The most important finding of our research seems to be, however, that companies, like 
economies, develop in cycles. If one considers the research of Peters and Waterman an excellent 
companies,34 one has to question why fifty-six of the sixty-two firms mentioned therein are in 
a crisis. This situation can be explained by our model. The financial ratlos used by Peters and 
Waterman typically look good if a company is in an opportunity situation, which according to 
our theory leads them in the long term to structural problems. These findings also correlate to 
Foster's findings on innovations. Foster has pointed out that present success is one of the most 
important obstacles to innovation. 
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Open Questions 
Our analysis leaves a range of questions open to further empirical and theoretical research. 
 
• Do government measures to improve the profitability of presently successful companies 
lead to a decrease in the willingness to innovate and to structural changes in the company? 
•  Do government subsidies given to companies having structural problems lead to a decrease 
in the willingness to innovate because the crisis situation is felt to a lesser extent? And does 
this lead to a delay of necessary structural change? 
•  Does it make sense at all to provide companies in an opportunity situation with government 
subsidies for innovations? 
•  Is the explanation of structural change based on the equilibrium theory still valid or do we 
need a theory of disequilibria? 
•  Does the playing down of a crisis situation perhaps hinder rather than further innovations? 
•  Does an economic policy seeking to bring about a balance between opportunity and crisis 
situations create an attitudinal obstacle to innovation and consequently to structural change? 
• Can business cycles be explained on the basis of microeconomics? 
 
Our research does not, of course, suggest that measures be taken to deliberately create genuine 
crises for successful companies in order to ensure that they continue to innovate. Rather, the 
question derived from our research is: How can successful companies simulate a crisis situation 
to keep the corporation going? Thus far, business administration theory adequately researched 
this question. However, several measures taken in the so-called excellent companies examined 
in the research of Peters and Waterman can be viewed as simulating a crisis. Modern Innovation 
management involves chaos theory, ambitious targets, clear "enemy pictures," reorganizations, 
delegation of responsibilities, scenario techniques (what will the company look like in ten years 
if nothing is done now?), hiring consultants as external Power-promotors and similar measures 
that can generate a feeling in the company of an overall crisis situation or that may lead the 
manager to see his own survival in the corporation as problematic. Also, target costing can 
simulate a crisis in a company. If the maximum costs are fixed, managers have to think hard 
about how product and/or process innovation can lead to the achievement of target costs. There 
seems to be a need to generate enough uncertainty in a company so that managers feel 
permanently insecure. One has to distinguish, however, between a stimulating and a paralyzing 
crisis. In a stimulating crisis the manager still sees a chance to succeed; that there are enough 
possibilities to overcome present problems. In a paralyzing crisis the manager is hopeless and 
helpless. He does not see any opportunity to emerge from the crisis, hence innovations will not 
be undertaken. In this regard, and in others, we believe that more can be learned from companies 
that have successfully overcome a crisis than from those in an opportunity situation. We would, 
therefore, stress that a search for a crisis, or simulation of a crisis, can be at least as valuable as 
a search for presently successful companies. 
    Whether or not this research on German managers can be transferred to managers with 
different cultural backgrounds needs further research. One also has to ask whether a crisis 
imposed from outside of the company leads to the same effect as a crisis from within. Another 
aspect of future research leads to the question as to whether managers from small- and medium-
sized companies behave in the same way as those from large corporations. Like all empirical 
surveys, our research raises more questions than it resolves. Further empirical as well as 
theoretical research on the theory of crisis is needed to analyze its impact an structural changes 
in companies and perhaps also in national economies. The chief aim of this article has been to 
encourage discussion of this topic. 
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